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A number of authors[22][75][76][77] give definitions of civil society that refer to voluntary associations and organisations outside the market and state. This definition is very close to that of the third sector, which consists of "private organisations that are formed and sustained by groups of people acting voluntarily and without seeking personal profit to provide benefits for themselves or for others".[citation needed] According to such authors as Walzer, Alessandrini, Newtown, Stolle and Rochon, Foley and Edwards, and Walters, it is through civil society, or more accurately, the third sector, that individuals are able to establish and maintain relational networks. These voluntary associations also connect people with each other, build trust and reciprocity through informal, loosely structured associations, and consolidate society through altruism without obligation. It is "this range of activities, services and associations produced by... civil society"[22] that constitutes the sources of social capital. If civil society, then, is taken to be synonymous with the third sector then the question it seems is not 'how important is social capital to the production of a civil society?' but 'how important is civil society to the production of social capital?'.[original research?] Not only have the authors above documented how civil society produces sources of social capital, but in Lyons work "Third Sector",[78] social capital does not appear in any guise under either the factors that enable or those that stimulate the growth of the third sector, and Onyx[79] describes how social capital depends on an already functioning community. The idea that creating social capital (i.e., creating networks) will strengthen civil society underlies current Australian social policy aimed at bridging deepening social divisions. The goal is to reintegrate those marginalised from the rewards of the economic system into "the community". However, according to Onyx (2000), while the explicit aim of this policy is inclusion, its effects are exclusionary. Foley and Edwards[80] believe that "political systems...are important determinants of both the character of civil society and of the uses to which whatever social capital exists might be put".[21] Alessandrini agrees, saying, "in Australia in particular, neo-liberalism has been recast as economic rationalism and identified by several theorists and commentators as a danger to society at large because of the use to which they are putting social capital to work".[22] The resurgence of interest in "social capital" as a remedy for the cause of today’s social problems draws directly on the assumption that these problems lie in the weakening of civil society. However this ignores the arguments of many theorists who believe that social capital leads to exclusion[citation needed] rather than to a stronger civil society. In international development, Ben Fine and John Harriss have been heavily critical of the inappropriate adoption of social capital as a supposed panacea (promoting civil society organisations and NGOs, for example, as agents of development) for the inequalities generated by neo liberal economic development.[81][82] This leads to controversy as to the role of state institutions in the promotion of social capital. An abundance of social capital is seen as being almost a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy. A low level of social capital leads to an excessively rigid and unresponsive political system and high levels of corruption, in the political system and in the region as a whole. Formal public institutions require social capital in order to function properly, and while it is possible to have too much social capital (resulting in rapid changes and excessive regulation), it is decidedly worse to have too little. Kathleen Dowley and Brian Silver published an article entitled "Social Capital, Ethnicity and Support for Democracy in the Post-Communist States". This article found that in post-communist states, higher levels of social capital did not equate to higher levels of democracy. However, higher levels of social capital led to higher support for democracy.[83] A number of intellectuals in developing countries have argued that the idea of social capital, particularly when connected to certain ideas about civil society, is deeply implicated in contemporary modes of donor and NGO driven imperialism and that it functions, primarily, to blame the poor for their condition.[84] The concept of social capital in a Chinese social context has been closely linked with the concept of guanxi. An interesting attempt to measure social capital spearheaded by Corporate Alliance[85] in the English speaking market segment of the United States of America and Xentrum[86] through the Latin American Chamber of Commerce[87] in Utah on the Spanish speaking population of the same country, involves the quantity, quality and strength of an individual social capital. With the assistance of software applications and web based relationship oriented systems such as LinkedIn, these kinds of organizations are expected to provide its members with a way to keep track of the number of their relationships, meetings designed to boost the strength of each relationship using group dynamics, executive retreats and networking events as well as training in how to reach out to higher circles of influential people. The term "social capital" was in occasional use from about 1890, but only became widely used in the late 1990s.[2] In the first half of the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville had observations about American life that seemed to outline and define social capital. He observed that Americans were prone to meeting at as many gatherings as possible to discuss all possible issues of state, economics, or the world that could be witnessed. The high levels of transparency caused greater participation from the people and thus allowed for democracy to work better. The French writers highlighted also that the level of social participation (social capital) in American society was directly linked to the equality of conditions (Ferragina, 2010; 2012; 2013). L. J. Hanifan's 1916 article regarding local support for rural schools is one of the first occurrences of the term "social capital" in reference to social cohesion and personal investment in the community.[3] In defining the concept, Hanifan contrasts social capital with material goods by defining it as: "I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit… If he may come into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbors (pp. 130-131)." John Dewey used the term in his monograph entitled "School and Society" in 1900, but he offered no definition of it. Jane Jacobs used the term early in the 1960s. Although she did not explicitly define the term "social capital", her usage referred to the value of networks.[4] Political scientist Robert Salisbury advanced the term as a critical component of interest group formation in his 1969 article "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups" in the Midwest Journal of Political Science. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu used the term in 1972 in his Outline of a Theory of Practice,[5] and clarified the term some years later in contrast to cultural, economic, and symbolic capital. Sociologists James Coleman, Barry Wellman and Scot Wortley adopted Glenn Loury's 1977 definition in developing and popularising the concept.[6] In the late 1990s the concept gained popularity, serving as the focus of a World Bank research programme and the subject of several mainstream books, including Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone[1] and Putnam and Lewis Feldstein's Better Together. The concept that underlies social capital has a much longer history; thinkers exploring the relation between associational life and democracy were using similar concepts regularly by the 19th century, drawing on the work of earlier writers such as James Madison (The Federalist Papers) and Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America) to integrate concepts of social cohesion and connectedness into the pluralist tradition in American political science. John Dewey may have made the first direct mainstream use of "social capital" in The School and Society in 1899, though he did not offer a definition. The power of 'community governance' has been stressed by many philosophers from Antiquity to the 18th century, from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Burke (Bowles and Gintis, 2002).[7] This vision was strongly criticised at the end of the 18th century, with the development of the idea of Homo Economicus and subsequently with 'rational choice theory'. Such a set of theories became dominant in the last centuries, but many thinkers questioned the complicated relationship between 'modern society' and the importance of 'old institutions', in particular family and traditional communities (Ferragina, 2010:75).[8] The debate of community versus modernization of society and individualism has been the most discussed topic among the fathers of sociology (Tönnies, 1887;[9] Durkheim, 1893;[10] Simmel, 1905;[11] Weber, 1946).[12] They were convinced that industrialisation and urbanization were transforming social relationship in an irreversible way. They observed a breakdown of traditional bonds and the progressive development of anomie and alienation in society (Wilmott, 1986).[13] After Tönnies' and Weber's works, reflection on social links in modern society continued with interesting contributions in the 1950s and in the 1960s, in particular 'The Mass Society Theory' (Bell, 1962;[14] Nisbet, 1969;[15] Stein, 1960;[16] Whyte, 1956).[17] They proposed themes similar to those of the founding fathers, with a more pessimistic emphasis on the development of society (Ferragina, 2010: 76). In the words of Stein (1960:1): “The price for maintaining a society that encourages cultural differentiation and experimentation is unquestionably the acceptance of a certain amount of disorganization on both the individual and social level.” All these reflections contributed remarkably to the development of the social capital concept in the following decades. The appearance of the modern social capital conceptualization is a new way to look at this debate, keeping together the importance of community to build generalized trust and the same time, the importance of individual free choice, in order to create a more cohesive society (Ferragina, 2010;[18] Ferragina, 2012[19] It is for this reason that social capital generated so much interest in the academic and political world (Rose, 2000).[20] Evaluating social capital Though Bourdieu might agree with Coleman that social capital in the abstract is a neutral resource, his work tends to show how it can be used practically to produce or reproduce inequality, demonstrating for instance how people gain access to powerful positions through the direct and indirect employment of social connections. Robert Putnam has used the concept in a much more positive light: though he was at first careful to argue that social capital was a neutral term, stating “whether or not [the] shared are praiseworthy is, of course, entirely another matter”,[21] his work on American society tends to frame social capital as a producer of "civic engagement" and also a broad societal measure of communal health.[22] He also transforms social capital from a resource possessed by individuals to an attribute of collectives, focusing on norms and trust as producers of social capital to the exclusion of networks. Mahyar Arefi[23] identifies consensus building as a direct positive indicator of social capital. Consensus implies “shared interest” and agreement among various actors and stakeholders to induce collective action. Collective action is thus an indicator of increased social capital. Edwards and Foley, as editors of a special edition of the American Behavioural Scientist on "Social Capital, Civil Society and Contemporary Democracy", raised two key issues in the study of social capital. First, social capital is not equally available to all, in much the same way that other forms of capital are differently available. Geographic and social isolation limit access to this resource. Second, not all social capital is created equally. The value of a specific source of social capital depends in no small part on the socio-economic position of the source with society. On top of this, Portes has identified four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of outsiders; excess claims on group members; restrictions on individual freedom; and downward levelling norms.[24] An interesting distinction of social organization is that between bonding and bridging ties, which complicates the neo-Tocquevillean view of social capital. Varshney studied the correlation between the presence of interethnic networks (bridging) versus intra-ethnic ones (bonding) on ethnic violence in India.[25] He argues that interethnic networks are agents of peace because they build bridges and manage tensions, by noting that if communities are organized only along intra-ethnic lines and the interconnections with other communities are very weak or even nonexistent, then ethnic violence is quite likely. Three main implications of intercommunal ties explain their worth: Facilitate communication in the community across ethnic lines Squelch false rumors Help the administration carry out its job and in particular peace, security and justice This is a useful distinction; nevertheless its implication on social capital can only be accepted if one espouses the functionalist understanding of the latter concept. Indeed, it can be argued that interethnic, as well as intra-ethnic networks can serve various purposes, either increasing or diminishing social capital. In fact, Varshney himself notes that intraethnic policing (equivalent to the “self-policing” mechanism proposed by Fearon and Laitin)[26] may lead to the same result as interethnic engagement. Finally, social capital is often linked to the success of democracy and political involvement. Robert D. Putnam, in his book Bowling Alone makes the argument that social capital is linked to the recent decline in American political participation.[27] Putnam's theoretical framework has been firstly applied to the South of Italy (Putnam, 1993). This framework has been rediscussed by considering simultaneously the condition of European regions and specifically Southern Italy (Ferragina, 2012; Ferragina, 2013).[28] Definitions, forms, and measurement Social capital lends itself to multiple definitions, interpretations, and uses. David Halpern argues that the popularity of social capital for policymakers is linked to the concept's duality, coming because "it has a hard nosed economic feel while restating the importance of the social." For researchers, the term is popular partly due to the broad range of outcomes it can explain;[29] the multiplicity of uses for social capital has led to a multiplicity of definitions. Social capital has been used at various times to explain superior managerial performance,[30] the growth of entrepreneurial firms,[31] improved performance of functionally diverse groups,[32] the value derived from strategic alliances,[33] and enhanced supply chain relations.[34] 'A resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes in the relationship among actors'; (Baker 1990, p. 619). Early attempts to define social capital focused on the degree to which social capital as a resource should be used for public good or for the benefit of individuals. Putnam[35] suggested that social capital would facilitate co-operation and mutually supportive relations in communities and nations and would therefore be a valuable means of combating many of the social disorders inherent in modern societies, for example crime. In contrast to those focusing on the individual benefit derived from the web of social relationships and ties individual actors find themselves in, attribute social capital to increased personal access to information and skill sets and enhanced power.[36] According to this view, individuals could use social capital to further their own career prospects, rather than for the good of organisations. In The Forms of Capital[37] Pierre Bourdieu distinguishes between three forms of capital: economic capital, cultural capital and social capital. He defines social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition."[38] His treatment of the concept is instrumental, focusing on the advantages to possessors of social capital and the “deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource.”[24] Quite contrary to Putnam's positive view of social capital, Bourdieu employs the concept to demonstrate a mechanism for the generational reproduction of inequality. Bourdieu thus points out that the wealthy and powerful use their "old boys network" or other social capital to maintain advantages for themselves, their social class, and their children. James Coleman defined social capital functionally as “a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors...within the structure”[24]—that is, social capital is anything that facilitates individual or collective action, generated by networks of relationships, reciprocity, trust, and social norms. In Coleman's conception, social capital is a neutral resource that facilitates any manner of action, but whether society is better off as a result depends entirely on the individual uses to which it is put.[21] According to Robert Putnam, social capital "refers to the collective value of all 'social networks' and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other."[1] According to Putnam and his followers, social capital is a key component to building and maintaining democracy. Putnam says that social capital is declining in the United States. This is seen in lower levels of trust in government and lower levels of civic participation. Putnam also says that television and urban sprawl have had a significant role in making America far less 'connected'. Putnam believes that social capital can be measured by the amount of trust and "reciprocity" in a community or between individuals.[citation needed] Nan Lin's concept of social capital has a more individualistic approach: "Investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace." This may subsume the concepts of some others such as Bourdieu, Flap and Eriksson.[39] Newton (1997) considered social capital as subjective phenomenon formed by values and attitudes which influence interactions. In "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda," Francis Fukuyama points out that there isn't an agreed definition of social capital, so he explains it as "shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual social relationships" (Fukuyama, 27), and uses this definition throughout this paper. He argues that social capital is a necessary precondition for successful development, but a strong rule of law and basic political institutions are necessary to build social capital. He believes that a strong social capital is necessary for a strong democracy and strong economic growth. Familism is a major problem of trust because it fosters a two-tiered moral system, in which a person must favor the opinions of family members. Fukuyama believes that bridging social capital (a phrase used by Putnam in Bowling Alone), is essential for a strong social capital because a broader radius of trust will enable connections across borders of all sorts and serve as a basis for organizations. Although he points out many problems and possible solutions in his paper, he does admit that there is still much to be done to build a strong social capital. The Social Capital Foundation (TSCF) suggested that social capital should not be mixed up with its manifestations. While for example social capital is often understood as the networks that a person possesses and that he/she may use in a social integration purpose, it is more the disposition to create, maintain and develop such networks that constitutes real social capital. Similarly, civic engagement is a manifestation of social capital but not social capital itself. In this definition, social capital is a collective mental disposition close to the spirit of community.[40] Nahapiet and Ghoshal in their examination of the role of social capital in the creation of intellectual capital, suggest that social capital should be considered in terms of three clusters: structural, relational, and cognitive.[41] Carlos García Timón describes that the structural dimensions of social capital relate to an individual ability to make weak and strong ties to others within a system. This dimension focuses on the advantages derived from the configuration of an actor's, either individual or collective, network.[citation needed] The differences between weak and strong ties are explained by Granovetter.[42] The relational dimension focuses on the character of the connection between individuals. This is best characterized through trust of others and their cooperation and the identification an individual has within a network. Hazleton and Kennan[43] added a third angle, that of communication. Communication is needed to access and use social capital through exchanging information, identifying problems and solutions, and managing conflict. According to Boisot[44] and Boland and Tenkasi,[45] meaningful communication requires at least some sharing context between the parties to such exchange. The cognitive dimension focusses on the shared meaning and understanding that individuals or groups have with one another.[citation needed] Robison, Schmid, and Siles[46] reviewed various definitions of social capital and concluded that many did not satisfy the formal requirement of a definition. They noted that definitions must be of the form A=B while many definition of social capital described what it can be used to achieve, where it resides, how it can be created, and what it can transform. In addition, they argue that many proposed definition of social capital fail to satisfy the requirements of capital. They propose that social capital be defined as "sympathy". The object of another's sympathy has social capital. Those who have sympathy for others provide social capital. One of the main advantages of having social capital is that it provides access to resources on preferential terms. Their definition of sympathy follows that used by Adam Smith, the title of his first chapter in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments." A network-based conception can also be used for characterizing the social capital of collectivities (such as organizations or business clusters).[47] Roots Social capital: a new name from an old idea The modern emergence of social capital concept renewed the academic interest for an old debate in social science: the relationship between trust, social networks and the development of modern industrial society. Social Capital Theory gained importance through the integration of classical sociological theory with the description of an intangible form of capital. In this way the classical definition of capital has been overcome allowing researchers to tackle issues in a new manner (Ferragina, 2010:73). Through the social capital concept researchers have tried to propose a synthesis between the value contained in the communitarian approaches and individualism professed by the 'rational choice theory.' Social capital can only be generated collectively thanks to the presence of communities and social networks, but individuals and groups can use it at the same time. Individuals can exploit social capital of their networks to achieve private objectives and groups can use it to enforce a certain set of norms or behaviors. In this sense, social capital is generated collectively but it can also be used individually, bridging the dichotomized approach 'communitarianism' versus 'individualism' (Ferragina, 2010:75).[48] Definitional issues The term "capital" is used by analogy with other forms of economic capital, as social capital is argued to have similar (although less measurable) benefits. However, the analogy with capital is misleading to the extent that, unlike traditional forms of capital, social capital is not depleted by use;[49] in fact it is depleted by non-use ("use it or lose it"). In this respect, it is similar to the now well-established economic concept of human capital. Social Capital is also distinguished from the economic theory Social Capitalism. Social Capitalism as a theory challenges the idea that Socialism and Capitalism are mutually exclusive. Social Capitalism posits that a strong social support network for the poor enhances capital output. By decreasing poverty, capital market participation is enlarged. Sub-types In his pioneering study, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000), Harvard political scientist Robert D. Putnam wrote: "Henry Ward Beecher's advice a century ago to 'multiply picnics' is not entirely ridiculous today. We should do this, ironically, not because it will be good for America — though it will be — but because it will be good for us."[1] Writing before the proliferation of the internet, Putnam claims to have found an overall decline in social capital (really civic engagement) in America over the past fifty years, a trend that may have significant implications for American society. Daniel P. Aldrich, Associate Professor at Purdue University, also argues the three mechanics of social capital. Aldrich defines the three differences as bonding, bridging, and linking social capital. Bonding capital is the relationships a person has with friends and family, making it also the strongest form of social capital. Bridging capital is the relationship between friends of friends, making its strength secondary to bonding capital. Linking capital is the relationship between a person and a government official or other elected leader. Aldrich also applies the ideas of social capital to the fundamental principles of disaster recovery, and discusses factors that either aid or impede recovery, such as extent of damage, population density, quality of government and aid. He primarily examines Japanese recovery following the 2011 Fukishima nuclear meltdown in his book "Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery." Putnam speaks of two main components of the concept: bonding social capital and bridging social capital, the creation of which Putnam credits to Ross Gittell and Avis Vidal. Bonding refers to the value assigned to social networks between homogeneous groups of people and Bridging refers to that of social networks between socially heterogeneous groups. Typical examples are that criminal gangs create bonding social capital, while choirs and bowling clubs (hence the title, as Putnam lamented their decline) create bridging social capital.[citation needed] Bridging social capital is argued to have a host of other benefits for societies, governments, individuals, and communities; Putnam likes to note that joining an organization cuts in half an individual's chance of dying within the next year.[citation needed] The distinction is useful in highlighting how social capital may not always be beneficial for society as a whole (though it is always an asset for those individuals and groups involved). Horizontal networks of individual citizens and groups that enhance community productivity and cohesion are said to be positive social capital assets whereas self-serving exclusive gangs and hierarchical patronage systems that operate at cross purposes to societal interests can be thought of as negative social capital burdens on society. Social capital development on the internet via social networking websites such as Facebook or Myspace tends to be bridging capital according to one study, though "virtual" social capital is a new area of research.[50] There are two other sub-sources of social capital. These are consummatory, or a behavior that is made up of actions that fulfill a basis of doing what is inherent, and instrumental, or behavior that is taught through ones surroundings over time.[51] Two examples of consummatory social capital are value interjection and solidarity. Value interjection pertains to a person or community that fulfills obligations such as paying bills on time, philanthropy, and following the rules of society. People that live their life this way feel that these are norms of society and are able to live their lives free of worry for their credit, children, and receive charity if needed. Coleman goes on to say that when people live in this way and benefit from this type of social capital, individuals in the society are able to rest assured that their belongings and family will be safe.[52] The other form of consummatory social capital, solidarity, dates back to the writings of Karl Marx, a German philosopher and political economist from the 19th century. The main focus of the study of Karl Marx was the working class of the Industrial Revolution. Marx analyzed the reasons these workers supported each other for the benefit of the group. He held that this support was an adaptation to the immediate time as opposed to a trait that was installed in them throughout their youth.[51] As another example, Coleman states that this type of social capital is the type that brings individuals to stand up for what they believe in, and even die for it, in the face of adversity.[53] The second of these two other sub-sources of social capital is that of instrumental social capital. The basis of the category of social capital is that an individual who donates his or her resources not because he is seeking direct repayment from the recipient, but because they are part of the same social structure. By his or her donation, the individual might not see a direct repayment, but, most commonly, they will be held by the society in greater honor.[53] The best example of this, and the one that Portes mentions, is the donation of a scholarship to a member of the same ethnic group. The donor is not freely giving up his resources to be directly repaid by the recipient, but, as stated above, the honor of the community. With this in mind, the recipient might not know the benefactor personally, but he or she prospers on the sole factor that he or she is a member of the same social group.[54] Measurement There is no widely held consensus on how to measure social capital, which has become a debate in itself: why refer to this phenomenon as 'capital' if there is no true way to measure it? While one can usually intuitively sense the level/amount of social capital present in a given relationship (regardless of type or scale), quantitative measuring has proven somewhat complicated. This has resulted in different metrics for different functions. In measuring political social capital, it is common to take the sum of society’s membership of its groups. Groups with higher membership (such as political parties) contribute more to the amount of capital than groups with lower membership, although many groups with low membership (such as communities) still add up to be significant. While it may seem that this is limited by population, this need not be the case as people join multiple groups. In a study done by Yankee City,[55] a community of 17,000 people was found to have over 22,000 different groups. Many studies measure social capital by asking the question: “do you trust the others?” Other researches analyse the participation in voluntary associations or civic activities. Knack and Keefer (1996) measured econometrically correlations between confidence and civic cooperation norms, with economic growth in a big group of countries. They found that confidence and civic cooperation have a great impact in economic growth, and that in less polarized societies in terms of inequality and ethnic differences, social capital is bigger. Narayan and Pritchet (1997) researched the associativity degree and economic performance in rural homes of Tanzania. They saw that even in high poverty indexes, families with higher levels of incomes had more participation in collective organizations. The social capital they accumulated because of this participation had individual benefits for them, and created collective benefits through different routes, for example: their agricultural practices were better than those of the families without participation (they had more information about agrochemicals, fertilizers and seeds); they had more information about the market; they were prepared to take more risks, because being part of a social network made them feel more protected; they had an influence on the improvement of public services, showing a bigger level of participation in schools; they cooperated more in the municipality level. The level of cohesion of a group also affects its social capital.[56] However, there is no one quantitative way of determining the level of cohesiveness, but rather a collection of social network models that researchers have used over the decades to operationalize social capital. One of the dominant methods is Ronald Burt's constraint measure, which taps into the role of tie strength and group cohesion. Another network based model is network transitivity. How a group relates to the rest of society also affects social capital, but in a different manner. Strong internal ties can in some cases weaken the group’s perceived capital in the eyes of the general public, as in cases where the group is geared towards crime, distrust, intolerance, violence or hatred towards others. The Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia are examples of these kinds of organizations. Sociologists Carl L. Bankston and Min Zhou have argued that one of the reasons social capital is so difficult to measure is that it is neither an individual-level nor a group-level phenomenon, but one that emerges across levels of analysis as individuals participate in groups. They argue that the metaphor of "capital" may be misleading because unlike financial capital, which is a resource held by an individual, the benefits of forms of social organization are not held by actors, but are results of the participation of actors in advantageously organized groups.[57] Recently, Foschi and Lauriola presented a measure of sociability as a proxy of social capital. The authors demonstrated that facets of sociability can mediate between general personality traits and measures of civic involvement and political participation, as predictors of social capital, in a holistic model of political behavior.[58] Integrating history and socio-economic analysis Beyond Putnam Robert Putnam's work contributed to shape the discussion of the importance of social capital. His conclusions have been praised but also criticised. Criticism has mainly focused on: the lack of awareness of the structural socio-economic conditions of society (see Skocpol 1996;[59] Skocpol et al. 2000;[60] Thomson 2005).[61] as for example, the level of income inequality (Knack and Keefer 1997;[62] Costa and Kahn 2003;[63] O'Connel 2003;[64] Ferragina 2010).[65] the excessive determinism of the historical analysis (Lupo 1993;[66] Lemann 1996;[67] Tarrow 1996).[68] Ferragina (2012;[19] 2013) integrated the insights of these two criticisms and proposed a cross-regional analysis of 85 European regions, linking together the socio-economic and the historic- institutional analyses to explore the determinants of social capital. He argued that to investigate the determinants of social capital, one has to integrate the synchronic and the diachronic perspectives under the guidance of a methodological framework able to put these two approaches in continuity. The Sleeping social capital theory Putnam’s work, nourished by doctrines like the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1992)[69] was largely deterministic, and proposed the dismissal of more articulated historical interpretations. This determinism has reduced Southern Italian history as being a negative path to modernity; only the Italian regions that experienced the development of medieval towns during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries have got high levels of social capital today, the others ‘are condemned’ by the prevalence of the authoritarian rule of the Normans more than 800 years ago. However, from a purely historical perspective, the medieval town is not unanimously considered to be a symbol of freedom, creation of horizontal ties and embryo of democratic life. In Making Democracy Work, Putnam disregarded the division within municipal towns and their dearth of civic participation and considered only the experience of few areas in North Central Italy, ignoring the existence of important towns in the South.[70] To this more complicated historical picture, Ferragina (2012)[19] added the result of a regression model, which indicated that social capital in the South of Italy and Wallonia should be much lower than currently detected according to their socio-economic condition. He unfolded Putnam’s theory by undertaking a comparative analysis between these two deviant cases and two regular cases located in the same country, namely Flanders and the North of Italy. The historical legacy does not have a negative effect on the present lack of social capital in Wallonia and the South of Italy, but the potentially positive effect of the historical legacy is currently curtailed by the poor socio-economic conditions, notably by the high level of income inequality and the low level of labour market participation. This historical interpretation is driven by the comparison with Flanders and the North East of Italy. The value of the historical legacy for present socio-economic development is similar to the ‘appropriable social capital’ theorized by Coleman (1990)[71] at the individual level.[72] Using the example of the Korean students, Coleman argued that the construction of a secret network of people (at a time in which the appreciation for the authoritarian government was rapidly declining among the population) as a means of organizing the democratic revolt was the result of a process of socialization that took place during their childhood (with the involvement in the local churches). The relation between historical evolutions and the socio-economic variables has similar characteristics at the macro level.[72] Only after reaching a sufficient level of labour market activity and income redistribution (this is comparable to the growing unpopularity of the authoritarian government) can the memory of historical events of social engagement become fully appropriable by the population (this is comparable to the participation in the local churches during childhood), leading to the development of innovative forms of social participation (this is comparable to the construction of the secret circles that enhanced the democratic revolt). This process increases social capital even further if socio-economic development is matched by the revival of the unique historical legacy of the area.[73] The reconstruction of this unique past can rapidly become a source of pride for the entire area, contributing in turn to an increasing intra-regional solidarity, and with it enhancement of social networks and social trust. The Flemish case (and also to a lesser extent that of the North East of Italy) illustrates this process well. The socio-economic improvements that took place in the nineteenth century were matched by the revival of the glorious Flemish traditions of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. The increase of social capital generated by the reduction of income inequality and the increasing participation in the labour market due to the economic development was multiplied by the reconstruction of Flemish identity and pride. This pride and self- confidence has, in turn, increased the feeling of solidarity within the region and contributed to generate a level of social capital, which is hardly explicable by the single socio-economic predictors.[72] Ferragina suggests that, in the divergent cases, the value of the historical legacy is affected by the poor present socio- economic conditions. Social capital sleeps, not because of the absence of certain clearly defined historical steps as suggested by Putnam, but because socio- economic underdevelopment profoundly depressed the self-pride of Southern Italians and Walloons. The biased and simplistic interpretations of Southern Italian and Walloon history will be discarded only when their socio-economic conditions reach a sufficient level, enacting a cycle similar to Flanders and the North East of Italy. Stronger redistribution, an increase of labour market participation accompanied by a simultaneous process of ‘reinvention of the past’ could enhance a positive cycle of social capital increase in both areas. The historical legacy in these two areas should not be seen as the root of the present lack of social capital but as a potential element for improvement. Important moments of social engagement also existed in the history of these two areas; the imagery of Walloons and Southern Italians should be nourished by these almost forgotten examples of collective history (i.e. the Fasci Siciliani in the south of Italy) rather than the prevailing idea that the historical legacy of these areas is simply an original sin, a burden to carry through the process of modernization.[72] Social Capital Motives Robison and colleagues measured the relative importance of selfishness and four social capital motives using resource allocation data collected in hypothetical surveys and non-hypothetical experiments. The selfishness motive assumes that an agent's allocation of a scarce resource is independent of his relationships with others. This motive is sometimes referred to as the selfishness of preference assumption in neoclassical economics. Social capital motives assume that agents’ allocation of a scarce resource may be influenced by their social capital or sympathetic relationships with others which may produce socio-emotional goods that satisfy socio-emotional needs for validation and belonging. The first social capital motive seeks for validation by acting consistently with the values of one’s ideal self. The second social capital motive seeks to be validated by others by winning their approval. The third social capital motive seeks to belong. Recognizing that one may not be able to influence the sympathy of others, persons seeking to belong may act to increase their own sympathy for others and the organizations or institutions they represent. The fourth social capital motive recognizes that our sympathy or social capital for another person will motivate us to act in their interest. In doing so we satisfy our own needs for validation and belonging. Empirical results reject the hypothesis often implied in economics that we are 95% selfish.[74] In sociology, social capital is the expected collective or economic benefits derived from the preferential treatment and cooperation between individuals and groups. Although different social sciences emphasize different aspects of social capital, they tend to share the core idea "that social networks have value". Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a university education (cultural capital or human capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so do social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups.[1] |
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