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In 1966 B. J. Vorster became Prime Minister. He was not prepared to dismantle apartheid, but he did try to redress South Africa's isolation and to revitalise the country's global reputation, even those with black-ruled nations in Africa. This he called his "Outward-Looking" policy.[101][102][103] Vorster's willingness to talk to African leaders stood in contrast to Verwoerd's refusal to engage with leaders such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria in 1962 and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1964. In 1966, he met the heads of the neighbouring states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. In 1967, he offered technological and financial aid to any African state prepared to receive it, asserting that no political strings were attached, aware that many African states needed financial aid despite their opposition to South Africa's racial policies. Many were also tied to South Africa economically because of their migrant labour population working on the South African mines. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland remained outspoken critics of apartheid, but depended on South Africa's economic aid. Malawi was the first country not on South African borders to accept South African aid. In 1967, the two states set out their political and economic relations, and, in 1969, Malawi became the only country at the assembly which did not sign the Lusaka Manifesto condemning South Africa' apartheid policy. In 1970, Malawian president Hastings Banda made his first and most successful official stopover in South Africa. Associations with Mozambique followed suit and were sustained after that country won its sovereignty in 1975. Angola was also granted South African loans. Other countries which formed relationships with South Africa were Liberia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius, Gabon, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the Central African Republic. Although these states condemned apartheid (more than ever after South Africa's denunciation of the Lusaka Manifesto), South Africa's economic and military dominance meant that they remained dependent on South Africa to varying degrees[clarification needed]. Cultural and sporting isolation Main articles: Sporting boycott of South Africa and Rugby union and apartheid South Africa's isolation in sport began in the mid-1950s and increased throughout the 1960s. Apartheid forbade multiracial sport, which meant that overseas teams, by virtue of their having players of diverse races, could not play in South Africa. In 1956, the International Table Tennis Federation severed its ties with the all-white South African Table Tennis Union, preferring the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board. The apartheid government responded by confiscating the passports of the Board's players so that they were unable to attend international games. In 1959, the non-racial South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed to secure the rights of all players on the global field. After meeting with no success in its endeavours to attain credit by collaborating with white establishments, SASA approached the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1962, calling for South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic Games. The IOC sent South Africa a caution to the effect that, if there were no changes, they would be barred from the 1964 Olympic Games. The changes were initiated, and in January 1963, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) was set up. The Anti-Apartheid Movement persisted in its campaign for South Africa's exclusion, and the IOC acceded in barring the country from the 1964 Games in Tokyo. South Africa selected a multi-racial team for the next Games, and the IOC opted for incorporation in the 1968 Games in Mexico. Because of protests from AAMs and African nations, however, the IOC was forced to retract the invitation. Foreign complaints about South Africa's bigoted sports brought more isolation. Racially selected New Zealand sports teams toured South Africa, until the 1970 All Blacks rugby tour allowed Maori to go under the status of "honorary whites". Huge and widespread protests occurred in New Zealand in 1981 against the Springbok tour – the government spent $8 million protecting games using the army and police force. A planned All Black tour to South Africa in 1985 remobilised the New Zealand protesters and it was cancelled. A "rebel tour"—not government sanctioned—went ahead in 1986, but after that sporting ties were cut, and New Zealand made a decision not to convey an authorised rugby team to South Africa until the end of apartheid.[104] Vorster replaced Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1966 following the latter's assassination, and declared that South Africa would no longer dictate to other countries what their teams should look like. Although this reopened the gate for international sporting meets, it did not signal the end of South Africa's racist sporting policies. In 1968 Vorster went against his policy by refusing to permit Basil D'Oliveira, a Coloured South African-born cricketer, to join the English cricket team on its tour to South Africa. Vorster said that the side had been chosen only to prove a point, and not on merit. After protests, however, "Dolly" was eventually included in the team. Protests against certain tours brought about the cancellation of a number of other visits, including that of an England rugby team touring South Africa in 1969/70. The first of the "White Bans" occurred in 1971 when the Chairman of the Australian Cricketing Association—Sir Don Bradman—flew to South Africa to meet Vorster. Vorster had expected Bradman to allow the tour of the Australian cricket team to go ahead, but things became heated after Bradman asked why black sportsmen were not allowed to play cricket. Vorster stated that blacks were intellectually inferior and had no finesse for the game. Bradman—thinking this ignorant and repugnant—asked Vorster if he had heard of a man named Garry Sobers. On his return to Australia, Bradman released a one sentence statement:[105] We will not play them until they choose a team on a non-racist basis. In South Africa, Vorster vented his anger publicly against Bradman, while the African National Congress rejoiced. This was the first time a predominantly white nation had taken the side of multiracial sport, producing an unsettling resonance that more "White" boycotts were coming.[106] Almost twenty years later, on his release from prison, Nelson Mandela asked a visiting Australian statesman if Donald Bradman, his childhood hero, was still alive (Bradman lived until 2001). In 1971, Vorster altered his policies even further by distinguishing multiracial from multinational sport. Multiracial sport, between teams with players of different races, remained outlawed; multinational sport, however, was now acceptable: international sides would not be subject to South Africa's racial stipulations. In 1978, Nigeria boycotted the Commonwealth Games because New Zealand's sporting contacts with the South African government were not considered to be in accordance with the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement. Nigeria also led the 32-nation boycott of the 1986 Commonwealth Games because of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher's ambivalent attitude towards sporting links with South Africa, significantly affecting the quality and profitability of the Games and thus thrusting apartheid into the international spotlight.[107] Sporting bans were revoked in 1993, when conciliations for a democratic South Africa were well under way. In the 1960s, the Anti-Apartheid Movements began to campaign for cultural boycotts of apartheid South Africa. Artists were requested not to present or let their works be hosted in South Africa. In 1963, 45 British writers put their signatures to an affirmation approving of the boycott, and, in 1964, American actor Marlon Brando called for a similar affirmation for films. In 1965, the Writers' Guild of Great Britain called for a proscription on the sending of films to South Africa. Over sixty American artists signed a statement against apartheid and against professional links with the state. The presentation of some South African plays in Britain and the United States was also vetoed. After the arrival of television in South Africa in 1975, the British Actors Union, Equity, boycotted the service, and no British programme concerning its associates could be sold to South Africa. Sporting and cultural boycotts did not have the same impact as economic sanctions, but they did much to lift consciousness amongst normal South Africans of the global condemnation of apartheid. Western influence London "Boycott Apartheid" bus, 1989 While international opposition to apartheid grew, the Nordic countries – and Sweden in particular – provided both moral and financial support for the ANC.[108] On 21 February 1986 – a week before he was murdered – Sweden's prime minister Olof Palme made the keynote address to the Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid held in Stockholm.[109] In addressing the hundreds of anti-apartheid sympathisers as well as leaders and officials from the ANC and the Anti-Apartheid Movement such as Oliver Tambo, Palme declared: Apartheid cannot be reformed; it has to be eliminated.[110] Other Western countries adopted a more ambivalent position. In Switzerland, the Swiss-South African Association lobbied on behalf of the South African government. In the 1980s, the US Reagan and UK Thatcher administrations followed a "constructive engagement" policy with the apartheid government, vetoing the imposition of UN economic sanctions, justified by a belief in free trade and a vision of South Africa as a bastion against Marxist forces in Southern Africa. Thatcher declared the ANC a terrorist organisation,[111] and in 1987 her spokesman, Bernard Ingham, famously said that anyone who believed that the ANC would ever form the government of South Africa was "living in cloud cuckoo land".[112] The American Legislative Exchange Council, a conservative lobbying organisation, actively campaigned against divesting from South Africa throughout the 1980s.[113] By the late 1980s, with the tide of the Cold War turning and no sign of a political resolution in South Africa, Western patience began to run out. By 1989, a bipartisan Republican/Democratic initiative in the US favoured economic sanctions (realised as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986), the release of Nelson Mandela and a negotiated settlement involving the ANC. Thatcher too began to take a similar line, but insisted on the suspension of the ANC's armed struggle.[114] Britain's significant economic involvement in South Africa may have provided some leverage with the South African government, with both the UK and the US applying pressure and pushing for negotiations. However, neither Britain nor the US was willing to apply economic pressure upon their multinational interests in South Africa, such as the mining company Anglo American. Although a high-profile compensation claim against these companies was thrown out of court in 2004,[115] the US Supreme Court in May 2008 upheld an appeal court ruling allowing another lawsuit that seeks damages of more than US$400 billion from major international companies which are accused of aiding South Africa's apartheid system.[116] South African Border War Main articles: South African Border War, Angolan Civil War and Cuban intervention in Angola By 1966, SWAPO launched guerilla raids from neighbouring countries against South Africa's occupation of South-West Africa (now Namibia). Initially South Africa fought a counter-insurgency war against SWAPO. This conflict deepened after Angola gained its independence in 1975 under the leadership of the leftist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) aided by Cuba. South Africa, Zaire and the United States sided with the Angolan rival UNITA party against the MPLA's armed force, FAPLA (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola). The following struggle turned into one of several late Cold War flashpoints.[117] The Angolan civil war developed into a conventional war with South Africa and UNITA on one side against the MPLA government, the Soviet Union, the Cubans and SWAPO on the other.[118] Total onslaught By 1980, as international opinion turned decisively against the apartheid regime, the government and much of the white population increasingly looked upon the country as a bastion besieged militarily, politically, culturally, ideologically, economically and socially by communism and radical black nationalists. Considerable effort was put into circumventing sanctions, and the government even went so far as to develop nuclear weapons, with the help of several different sources; these sources allegedly include Israel.[119] In 2010, The Guardian released South African government documents that revealed an Israeli offer to sell Apartheid South Africa nuclear weapons.[120][121] Israel categorically denied these allegations and claimed that the documents were minutes from a meeting which did not indicate any concrete offer for a sale of nuclear weapons. Shimon Peres said that The Guardian's article was based on "selective interpretation... and not on concrete facts."[122] By the 1980s, Israel was South Africa's only close ally amongst developed countries, but ties were broken, beginning in 1987 (see Israel–South Africa relations).[123] The term "front-line states" referred to countries in Southern Africa geographically near South Africa. Although these front-line states were all opposed to apartheid, many were economically dependent on South Africa. In 1980, they formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the aim of which was to promote economic development in the region and hence reduce dependence on South Africa. Many SADCC members allowed the exiled ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) to establish bases. Cross-border raids South Africa had a policy of attacking guerrilla-bases and safe houses of the ANC, PAC and SWAPO in neighbouring countries beginning in the early 1980s.[124] These attacks were in retaliation for acts of terror such as bomb explosions, massacres and guerrilla actions (like sabotage) by ANC, PAC and SWAPO guerrillas in South Africa and Namibia. The country also aided organisations in surrounding countries who were actively combating the spread of communism in southern Africa. The results of these policies included: Support for guerrilla groups such as UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique South African Defence Force (SADF) hit-squad raids into front-line states (e.g. the Raid on Gaborone). Bombing raids were also conducted into neighbouring states. Air and commando raids into Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana occurred the same day, against ANC targets.[125] An assassination attempt on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe on 18 December 1981.[126] A full-scale intervention into Angola: this was partly in support of UNITA, but was also an attempt to strike at SWAPO bases.[127] Bomb attacks in Lesotho.[126] Kidnapping of refugees and ANC members in Swaziland by security services.[126] An unsuccessful South African organised coup in the Seychelles on 25 November 1981.[126] Targeting of exiled ANC leaders abroad: Joe Slovo's wife Ruth First was killed by a parcel bomb in Maputo, and "death squads" of the Civil Cooperation Bureau and the Directorate of Military Intelligence attempted to carry out assassinations on ANC targets in Brussels, Paris,[128] Stockholm, and London.[129] In 1984, Mozambican president Samora Machel signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa's president P.W. Botha, in an attempt to rebuild Mozambique's economy. South Africa agreed to cease supporting anti-government forces, while the MK was prohibited from operating in Mozambique. This was a setback for the ANC. Two years later, President Machel was killed in an air crash in mountainous terrain in South Africa near the Mozambican border after returning from a meeting in Zambia. South Africa was accused by the Mozambican government and US Secretary of State George P. Shultz of continuing its aid to RENAMO. The Mozambiquan government also made an unproven allegation that the accident was caused intentionally by a false radio navigation beacon that lured the aircraft into crashing.[130][131] This conspiracy theory was never proven and is still a subject of some controversy, despite the South African Margo Commission finding that the crash was an accident. A Soviet delegation that did not participate in the investigation issued a minority report implicating South Africa.[132] State security During the 1980s the government, led by P.W. Botha, became increasingly preoccupied with security. It set up a powerful state security apparatus to "protect" the state against an anticipated upsurge in political violence that the reforms were expected to trigger. The 1980s became a period of considerable political unrest, with the government becoming increasingly dominated by Botha's circle of generals and police chiefs (known as securocrats), who managed the various States of Emergencies.[133] Botha's years in power were marked also by numerous military interventions in the states bordering South Africa, as well as an extensive military and political campaign to eliminate SWAPO in Namibia. Within South Africa, meanwhile, vigorous police action and strict enforcement of security legislation resulted in hundreds of arrests and bans, and an effective end to the ANC's sabotage campaign. The government punished political offenders brutally. 40,000 people were subjected to whipping as a form of punishment annually.[134] The vast majority had committed political offences and were lashed ten times for their crime.[135] If convicted of treason, a person could be hanged, and the government executed numerous political offenders in this way. As the 1980s progressed, more and more anti-apartheid organisations were formed and affiliated with the UDF. Led by the Reverend Allan Boesak and Albertina Sisulu, the UDF called for the government to abandon its reforms and instead abolish apartheid and eliminate the homelands completely. State of emergency Serious political violence was a prominent feature from 1985 to 1989, as black townships became the focus of the struggle between anti-apartheid organisations and the Botha government. Throughout the 1980s, township people resisted apartheid by acting against the local issues that faced their particular communities. The focus of much of this resistance was against the local authorities and their leaders, who were seen to be supporting the government. By 1985, it had become the ANC's aim to make black townships "ungovernable" (a term later replaced by "people's power") by means of rent boycotts and other militant action. Numerous township councils were overthrown or collapsed, to be replaced by unofficial popular organisations, often led by militant youth. People's courts were set up, and residents accused of being government agents were dealt extreme and occasionally lethal punishments. Black town councillors and policemen, and sometimes their families, were attacked with petrol bombs, beaten, and murdered by necklacing, where a burning tyre was placed around the victim's neck, after they were retrained by wrapping their wrists with barbed wire. This signature act of torture and murder was embraced by the ANC and its leaders. On 20 July 1985, Botha declared a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts. Areas affected were the Eastern Cape, and the PWV region ("Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging").[136] Three months later the Western Cape was included. An increasing number of organisations were banned or listed (restricted in some way); many individuals had restrictions such as house arrest imposed on them. During this state of emergency about 2,436 people were detained under the Internal Security Act.[137] This act gave police and the military sweeping powers. The government could implement curfews controlling the movement of people. The president could rule by decree without referring to the constitution or to parliament. It became a criminal offence to threaten someone verbally or possess documents that the government perceived to be threatening, to advise anyone to stay away from work or oppose the government, and to disclose the name of anyone arrested under the State of Emergency until the government released that name, with up to ten years' imprisonment for these offences. Detention without trial became a common feature of the government's reaction to growing civil unrest and by 1988, 30,000 people had been detained.[138] The media was censored, thousands were arrested and many were interrogated and tortured.[139] On 12 June 1986, four days before the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, the state of emergency was extended to cover the whole country. The government amended the Public Security Act, including the right to declare "unrest" areas, allowing extraordinary measures to crush protests in these areas. Severe censorship of the press became a dominant tactic in the government's strategy and television cameras were banned from entering such areas. The state broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), provided propaganda in support of the government. Media opposition to the system increased, supported by the growth of a pro-ANC underground press within South Africa. In 1987, the State of Emergency was extended for another two years. Meanwhile, about 200,000 members of the National Union of Mineworkers commenced the longest strike (three weeks) in South African history. 1988 saw the banning of the activities of the UDF and other anti-apartheid organisations. Much of the violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s was directed at the government, but a substantial amount was between the residents themselves. Many died in violence between members of Inkatha and the UDF-ANC faction. It was later proven that the government manipulated the situation by supporting one side or the other when it suited it. Government agents assassinated opponents within South Africa and abroad; they undertook cross-border army and air-force attacks on suspected ANC and PAC bases. The ANC and the PAC in return exploded bombs at restaurants, shopping centres and government buildings such as magistrates courts. Between 1960 and 1994, according to statistics from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Inkatha Freedom Party was responsible for 4,500 killings, South African security forces were responsible for 2,700 killings and the ANC was responsible for 1,300 killings.[140] The state of emergency continued until 1990, when it was lifted by State President F.W. de Klerk. Final years of apartheid Main article: Negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa This article is written like a personal reflection or opinion essay that states the Wikipedia editor's particular feelings about a topic, rather than the opinions of experts. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (September 2008) Factors Institutional racism Apartheid developed by racism of colonial factors and due to South Africa's "unique industrialization".[141] The policies of industrialisation led to segregation of and classing of people, which was "specifically developed to nurture early industry such as mining and capitalist culture".[141] Cheap labour was the basis of the economy and this was taken from what the state classed as peasant groups and the migrants.[142] Furthermore, Philip Bonner highlights the "contradictory economic effects" as the economy did not have a manufacturing sector, therefore promoting short term profitability but limiting labour productivity and the size of local markets. This also led to its collapse as "Clarkes emphasises the economy could not provide and compete with foreign rivals as they failed to master cheap labour and complex chemistry".[143] Economic contradictions Moreover the contradictions in the economy of the Apartheid state led to considerable debate among state policy, and division and conflicts in the central state.[144] To a large extent the political ideology of Apartheid had emerged from the colonisation of Africa by western states who institutionalised racial discrimination, enslavement, and exercised a purpose of "civilising inferior natives."[144] This can be seen in Calvinistic Christian-nationalism, with its western ideology of Apartheid.[145] For example, seen in "1933 when the executive of council Broederband enforced total mass segregation."[145] Similarly to the economy, the political factor teemed with contradictions seen within the policies of the parties. This was further weakened when different political groups emerged, many of whom were against Apartheid. Leading to revolts like the "1984 township revolt that quickened the breakdown of Apartheid."[145] Western influence Anti-apartheid protest at South Africa House in London, 1989 External western influence can be seen as one of the factors that arguably greatly influenced political ideology, particularly due to the influences of colonisation. South Africa in particular is argued to be an "unreconstructed example of western civilisation twisted by racism".[146] However, western influence also helped end apartheid. "Once the power of the Soviet Union declined along with its Communist influence, western nations felt Apartheid could no longer be tolerated and spoke out, encouraging a move towards democracy and self-determination".[this quote needs a citation] In the 1960s, South Africa experienced economic growth second only to that of Japan.[147] Trade with Western countries grew, and investment from the United States, France and Britain poured in. In 1974, resistance to apartheid was encouraged by Portugal's withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola, after the 1974 Carnation Revolution. South African troops withdrew from Angola in early 1976, failing to prevent the MPLA from gaining power there, and black students in South Africa celebrated. The Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith, signed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Harry Schwarz in 1974, enshrined the principles of peaceful transition of power and equality for all. Its purpose was to provide a blueprint for South Africa by consent and racial peace in a multi-racial society, stressing opportunity for all, consultation, the federal concept, and a Bill of Rights. It caused a split in the United Party that ultimately realigned opposition politics in South Africa, with the formation of the Progressive Federal Party in 1977. It was the first of such agreements by acknowledged black and white political leaders in South Africa. In 1978, the defence minister of the NP, Pieter Willem Botha, became Prime Minister. Botha's white regime was worried about the Soviet Union helping revolutionaries in South Africa, and the economy had slowed down. The new government noted that it was spending too much money trying to maintain the segregated homelands that had been created for blacks and the homelands were proving to be uneconomical.[citation needed] Nor was maintaining blacks as a third class working well. The labour of blacks remained vital to the economy, and illegal black labour unions were flourishing. Many blacks remained too poor to make much of a contribution to the economy through their purchasing power – although they were more than 70% of the population. Botha's regime was afraid that an antidote was needed to prevent the blacks from being attracted to Communism.[citation needed] In July 1979, the Nigerian government claimed that the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) was selling Nigerian oil to South Africa, although there was little evidence or commercial logic for such sales.[148] The alleged sanctions-breaking was used to justify the seizure of some of BP's assets in Nigeria including their stake in SPDC, although it appears the real reasons were economic nationalism and domestic politics ahead of the Nigerian elections.[149] Many South Africans attended schools in Nigeria,[citation needed] and Nelson Mandela several times acknowledged the role of Nigeria in the struggle against apartheid.[citation needed] In the 1980s, the anti-apartheid movements in the United States and Europe were gaining support for boycotts against South Africa, for the withdrawal of US firms from South Africa and for the release of Mandela. South Africa was becoming an outlaw in the world community of nations. Investing in South Africa by Americans and others was coming to an end and an active policy of disinvestment ensued. Notable student protests: University of Illinois campuses There were several notable student-led protests against apartheid throughout the United States in hopes of convincing their colleges and universities to promote divestment. Forming the Champaign-Urbana Coalition against Apartheid (CU-CAA) in 1977, students feverishly made attempts at persuading the university to consider divestment beginning with a stop at the University of Illinois Foundation and then to President John Corbally's office to urge him to open a debate against apartheid. Despite his reluctance to participate, several other university administrators agreed to support the coalition's efforts, in turn leading to the development of the Coalition for Illinois Divestment from South Africa (CIDSA) in 1983 which teamed with CU-CAA to continue the movement. However, the university continued to deny the students proposals for Board of Trustees President Nina T. Shepherd to defer the $21 million that the school had invested in South Africa corporations. As a result, students staged a public protest on the Chicago campus on 21 June 1985, which ended with 16 students being arrested. The tense situation continued as a 6.4% tuition fee increase was instituted on 12 April 1986, leading to a flurry of protests that resulted in 60 students being arrested and a 300-student "mock riot" on the following day. As opposition continued, university president Stanley Ikenberry made an unsuccessful proposal for divestment on 11 September 1986, which set the stage for a Board resolution on 14 January 1987 calling for an 18-month divestment plan, which, despite its best intentions, resulted in a divestment of only $3.3 million.[150] Tricameral parliament Main article: Tricameral Parliament In the early 1980s, Botha's National Party government started to recognise the inevitability of the need to reform apartheid.[151] Early reforms were driven by a combination of internal violence, international condemnation, changes within the National Party's constituency, and changing demographics—whites constituted only 16% of the total population, in comparison to 20% fifty years earlier.[152] In 1983, a new constitution was passed implementing what was called the Tricameral Parliament, giving coloureds and Indians voting rights and parliamentary representation in separate houses – the House of Assembly (178 members) for whites, the House of Representatives (85 members) for coloureds and the House of Delegates (45 members) for Indians.[153] Each House handled laws pertaining to its racial group's "own affairs", including health, education and other community issues.[154] All laws relating to "general affairs" (matters such as defence, industry, taxation and Black affairs) were handled by a cabinet made up of representatives from all three houses. However, the white chamber had a large majority on this cabinet, ensuring that effective control of the country remained in white hands.[155][156] Blacks, although making up the majority of the population, were excluded from representation; they remained nominal citizens of their homelands.[157] The first Tricameral elections were largely boycotted by Coloured and Indian voters, amid widespread rioting.[158] Reforms and contact with the ANC under Botha Concerned over the popularity of Mandela, Botha denounced him as an arch-Marxist committed to violent revolution, but to appease black opinion and nurture Mandela as a benevolent leader of blacks, the government moved him from Robben Island to Pollsmoor Prison in a rural area just outside Cape Town, where prison life was easier. The government allowed Mandela more visitors, including visits and interviews by foreigners, to let the world know that he was being treated well. Black homelands were declared nation-states and pass laws were abolished. Black labour unions were legitimised, the government recognised the right of blacks to live in urban areas permanently and gave blacks property rights there. Interest was expressed in rescinding the law against interracial marriage and also rescinding the law against sex between the races, which was under ridicule abroad. The spending for black schools increased, to one-seventh of what was spent per white child, up from on one-sixteenth in 1968. At the same time, attention was given to strengthening the effectiveness of the police apparatus. In January 1985, Botha addressed the government's House of Assembly and stated that the government was willing to release Mandela on condition that Mandela pledge opposition to acts of violence to further political objectives. Mandela's reply was read in public by his daughter Zinzi – his first words distributed publicly since his sentence to prison twenty-one years before. Mandela described violence as the responsibility of the apartheid regime and said that with democracy there would be no need for violence. The crowd listening to the reading of his speech erupted in cheers and chants. This response helped to further elevate Mandela's status in the eyes of those, both internationally and domestically, who opposed apartheid. Between 1986 and 1988, some petty apartheid laws were repealed. Botha told white South Africans to "adapt or die"[159] and twice he wavered on the eve of what were billed as "rubicon" announcements of substantial reforms, although on both occasions he backed away from substantial changes. Ironically, these reforms served only to trigger intensified political violence through the remainder of the eighties as more communities and political groups across the country joined the resistance movement. Botha's government stopped short of substantial reforms, such as lifting the ban on the ANC, PAC and SACP and other liberation organisations, releasing political prisoners, or repealing the foundation laws of grand apartheid. The government's stance was that they would not contemplate negotiating until those organisations "renounced violence". By 1987, South Africa's economy was growing at one of the lowest rates in the world, and the ban on South African participation in international sporting events was frustrating many whites in South Africa. Examples of African states with black leaders and white minorities existed in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Whispers of South Africa one day having a black President sent more hardline whites into Rightist parties. Mandela was moved to a four-bedroom house of his own, with a swimming pool and shaded by fir trees, on a prison farm just outside Cape Town. He had an unpublicised meeting with Botha. Botha impressed Mandela by walking forward, extending his hand and pouring Mandela's tea. The two had a friendly discussion, with Mandela comparing the African National Congress' rebellion with that of the Afrikaner rebellion and talking about everyone being brothers. A number of clandestine meetings were held between the ANC-in-exile and various sectors of the internal struggle, such as women and educationalists. More overtly, a group of white intellectuals met the ANC in Senegal for talks.[160] Presidency of F.W. de Klerk De Klerk and Mandela in Davos, 1992 Early in 1989, Botha suffered a stroke; he was prevailed upon to resign in February 1989.[161] He was succeeded as president later that year by F.W. de Klerk. Despite his initial reputation as a conservative, de Klerk moved decisively towards negotiations to end the political stalemate in the country. In his opening address to parliament on 2 February 1990, de Klerk announced that he would repeal discriminatory laws and lift the 30-year ban on leading anti-apartheid groups such as the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the United Democratic Front. The Land Act was brought to an end. De Klerk also made his first public commitment to release Nelson Mandela, to return to press freedom and to suspend the death penalty. Media restrictions were lifted and political prisoners not guilty of common-law crimes were released. On 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from Victor Verster Prison after more than 27 years of confinement. Having been instructed by the UN Security Council to end its long-standing involvement in South-West Africa / Namibia, and in the face of military stalemate in Southern Angola, and an escalation in the size and cost of the combat with the Cubans, the Angolans, and SWAPO forces and the growing cost of the border war, South Africa negotiated a change of control; Namibia became independent on 21 March 1990. Negotiations Main article: Negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa Apartheid was dismantled in a series of negotiations from 1990 to 1993, culminating in elections in 1994, the first in South Africa with universal suffrage. From 1990 to 1996 the legal apparatus of apartheid was abolished. In 1990 negotiations were earnestly begun, with two meetings between the government and the ANC. The purpose of the negotiations was to pave the way for talks towards a peaceful transition of power. These meetings were successful in laying down the preconditions for negotiations – despite the considerable tensions still abounding within the country. At the first meeting, the NP and ANC discussed the conditions for negotiations to begin. The meeting was held at Groote Schuur, the President's official residence. They released the Groote Schuur Minute, which said that before negotiations commenced political prisoners would be freed and all exiles allowed to return. There were fears that the change of power would be violent. To avoid this, it was essential that a peaceful resolution between all parties be reached. In December 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) began negotiations on the formation of a multiracial transitional government and a new constitution extending political rights to all groups. CODESA adopted a Declaration of Intent and committed itself to an "undivided South Africa". Reforms and negotiations to end apartheid led to a backlash among the right-wing white opposition, leading to the Conservative Party winning a number of by-elections against NP candidates. De Klerk responded by calling a whites-only referendum in March 1992 to decide whether negotiations should continue. A 68 per cent majority gave its support, and the victory instilled in de Klerk and the government a lot more confidence, giving the NP a stronger position in negotiations. When negotiations resumed in May 1992, under the tag of CODESA II, stronger demands were made. The ANC and the government could not reach a compromise on how power should be shared during the transition to democracy. The NP wanted to retain a strong position in a transitional government, and the power to change decisions made by parliament. Persistent violence added to the tension during the negotiations. This was due mostly to the intense rivalry between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC and the eruption of some traditional tribal and local rivalries between the Zulu and Xhosa historical tribal affinities, especially in the Southern Natal provinces. Although Mandela and Buthelezi met to settle their differences, they could not stem the violence. One of the worst cases of ANC-IFP violence was the Boipatong massacre of 17 June 1992, when 200 IFP militants attacked the Gauteng township of Boipatong, killing 45. Witnesses said that the men had arrived in police vehicles, supporting claims that elements within the police and army contributed to the ongoing violence. Subsequent judicial inquiries found the evidence of the witnesses to be unreliable or discredited, and that there was no evidence of National Party or police involvement in the massacre. When de Klerk visited the scene of the incident he was initially warmly welcomed, but he was suddenly confronted by a crowd of protesters brandishing stones and placards. The motorcade sped from the scene as police tried to hold back the crowd. Shots were fired by the police, and the PAC stated that three of its supporters had been gunned down.[162] Nonetheless, the Boipatong massacre offered the ANC a pretext to engage in brinkmanship. Mandela argued that de Klerk, as head of state, was responsible for bringing an end to the bloodshed. He also accused the South African police of inciting the ANC-IFP violence. This formed the basis for ANC's withdrawal from the negotiations, and the CODESA forum broke down completely at this stage. The Bisho massacre on 7 September 1992 brought matters to a head. The Ciskei Defence Force killed 29 people and injured 200 when they opened fire on ANC marchers demanding the reincorporation of the Ciskei homeland into South Africa. In the aftermath, Mandela and de Klerk agreed to meet to find ways to end the spiralling violence. This led to a resumption of negotiations. Right-wing violence also added to the hostilities of this period. The assassination of Chris Hani on 10 April 1993 threatened to plunge the country into chaos. Hani, the popular general secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), was assassinated in 1993 in Dawn Park in Johannesburg by Janusz Waluś, an anti-communist Polish refugee who had close links to the white nationalist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). Hani enjoyed widespread support beyond his constituency in the SACP and ANC and had been recognised as a potential successor to Mandela; his death brought forth protests throughout the country and across the international community, but ultimately proved a turning point, after which the main parties pushed for a settlement with increased determination.[163] On 25 June 1993, the AWB used an armoured vehicle to crash through the doors of the Kempton Park World Trade Centre where talks were still going ahead under the Negotiating Council, though this did not derail the process.[164] In addition to the continuing "black-on-black" violence, there were a number of attacks on white civilians by the PAC's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). The PAC was hoping to strengthen their standing by attracting the support of the angry, impatient youth. In the St James Church massacre on 25 July 1993, members of the APLA opened fire in a church in Cape Town, killing 11 members of the congregation and wounding 58. In 1993 de Klerk and Mandela were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for their work for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa".[165] Violence persisted right up to the 1994 elections. Lucas Mangope, leader of the Bophuthatswana homeland, declared that it would not take part in the elections. It had been decided that, once the temporary constitution had come into effect, the homelands would be incorporated into South Africa, but Mangope did not want this to happen. There were strong protests against his decision, leading to a coup d'état in Bophuthatswana on 10 March that deposed Mangope, despite the intervention of white right-wingers hoping to maintain him in power. Three AWB militants were killed during this intervention, and harrowing images were shown on national television and in newspapers across the world. Two days before the elections, a car bomb exploded in Johannesburg, killing nine.[166][167] The day before the elections, another one went off, injuring 13. At midnight on 26–27 April 1994 the old flag was lowered, and the old (now co-official) national anthem Die Stem ("The Call") was sung, followed by the raising of the new rainbow flag and singing of the other co-official anthem, Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika ("God Bless Africa"). |
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